This collection of historical vignettes seeks to sharpen our understanding of Mission Command philosophy and practice by providing examples from the past in which Mission Command principles played a decisive role. Some vignettes show junior officers following their commander’s intent and exercising disciplined initiative in very chaotic combat operations.
Strategic and political leaders have determined that the US and ISAF campaign assessments were neither useful nor accurate. The DOD 1230 biannual report titled the Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan provides comprehensive information to strategic and political leaders regarding the progress of the United States' strategy in Afghanistan.
The operational commander has the responsibility to link tactical actions in time, space, and purpose to achieve the policy-maker's strategic objectives. Combat power and operational initiative sustained by tempo set the conditions for the decisive action that explicates these tactics. However, these tasks require a capable sustainment architecture that is flexible.
NATO has endured beyond the end of the Cold War by shifting its focus from collective defense to out of area operations. NATO exists only through the voluntary contributions of its members. The United States provides a very large proportion of NATO forces and resources and, thus, has been very interested in getting members to contribute more.
When faced with any type of irregular warfare, technology integration has proved to be problematic for developed countries with technologically advanced militaries. Developed countries train and equip their militaries and develop military doctrines that tend to focus on protection from other developed countries.
The purpose of this study is to provide an analysis of the U.S. military's usage of various small arms and their associated cartridges from WWII to current day. The primary objective centers on an analysis of the driving factors and decisions used in military cartridge selection and development.
This excellent report, professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, claims that the inability of the United States to achieve its stated political objectives in its global war on terror (GWOT) reflects its flawed kinetic-centric military strategy.