Essential Guide to the 1975 Mayaguez Crisis: Mission Command and Civil-Military Relations, Near Disaster for Marines at Koh Tang, Poor Intelligence, President Ford, Henry Kissinger, and Cambodia
Two comprehensive reports about the 1975 Mayaguez ship incident involving Cambodia have been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction - The Mayaguez Crisis, Mission Command, and Civil-Military Relations, and The Mayaguez Incident: Near Disaster at Koh Tang. More
Two comprehensive reports about the 1975 Mayaguez ship incident involving Cambodia have been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction - this is not a print replica, and thus it is suitable for all devices.
Contents: The Mayaguez Crisis, Mission Command, and Civil-Military Relations * The Mayaguez Incident: Near Disaster at Koh Tang
President Gerald R. Ford's 1975 decision to use force after the Cambodians seized the SS Mayaguez merchant ship is an important case study in national security decision making. It was the first test of the War Powers Act and the only time a president ever directly managed a crisis through the National Security Council. Significant differences existed between the military and the White House over the use of force during the crisis. While often viewed as the last battle of the Vietnam War, the Ford administration was mainly driven by concerns in Korea. The Mayaguez crisis is one of the best documented but least-understood crises in U.S. history. Copious documentation, including declassified White House meeting minutes and notes from private conversations, has not produced a good, consensus explanation for U.S. behavior. The event is still explained as a rescue mission, a defense of freedom of the seas, an exercise in realpolitik, a political gambit to enhance Ford's domestic political fortunes, and a national spasm of violence arising from frustration over losing Vietnam. Widespread confusion about what happened and why it did contributes to equally confused explanations for U.S. behavior. Even President Ford never understood the exact roles his two strongest advisors, Henry A. Kissinger and James R. Schlesinger, played during the crisis. Now, however, with new sources and penetrating analysis, Christopher J. Lamb's The Mayaguez Crisis, Mission Command, and Civil-Military Relations demonstrates how three decades of scholarship mischaracterized U.S. motives and why the allegation of civilian micromanagement is wrong. He then extracts lessons for current issues such as mission command philosophy, civil-military relations, and national security reform. In closing he makes the argument that the incredible sacrifices made by U.S. servicemen during the crisis might have been avoided but were not in vain.
From the second book: Chaotic, confused, and incomplete planning based on faulty intelligence proved to be a recipe for disaster. During the operation, the same problems of command and control that plagued it during planning were present to a greater degree and accentuated the fog and friction of the battle. At the operational level, there was little situational awareness, and no one was in command or coordinating the battlespace. Throughout the fight, there were occasions when the Marines were nearly overrun by the numerically superior, well-trained, and disciplined enemy force. During the fourteen hour battle seemingly minor tactical events influenced the outcome. The tactical leadership, initiative, and individual heroism of countless servicemen overcame significant command and control obstacles to prevent tactical defeat and strategic failure. Superior technology and firepower did not dominate the battlefield at Koh Tang. The fighting ability, courage, and steadfast determination of Marines and airmen prevailed to achieve strategic objectives. Technology cannot replace the intangible factors that influence all levels of war.
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